

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

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FM USMISSION USNATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2333
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
CINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USLOSACLANT NORFOLK VA
USNMR SHAPE BE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 06116

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MPOL, NATO, TU, GR
SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH TURKISH DEFAD ON GREEK/NATO
NEGOTIATIONS, US TURKISH DEFENSE AID, AND LTDP

.
SUMMARY: IN DISCUSSION WITH MISSION OFFICER, TURKISH
DEFAD OZCERI STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE THAT ANKARA ATTACHED
TO THE NEED FOR DPC DISCUSSION OF THE DETAILS OF SACEUR'S
TALKS WITH THE GREEKS ON THEIR FUTURE NATO RELATIONSHIP,
SAID THAT ECEVIT HAD BEEN GREATLY ENCOURAGED BY THE
ADMINISTRATION'S ATTITUDE ON LIFTING THE TURKISH AID
RESTRICTIONS, AND THOUGHT ANKARA WAS LIKELY TO SUPPORT
THE US POSITION ON THE NEED FOR PROGRAM MONITORS OF
THE LTDP. END SUMMARY.

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1. GREEK/NATO NEGOTIATIONS. TURKISH DEFAD OZCERI
CALLED ON MISSION OFFICER ON 15 JUNE (APPARENTLY ON
INSTRUCTIONS) TO UNDERSCORE THE IMPORTANCE ANKARA
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CONTINUES TO ATTACH TO NATO'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH GREECE
ON REINTEGRATION INTO THE MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE.

. A. OZCERI MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

. -- ANKARA HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT SACEUR'S
EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH GREECE WERE ABOUT TO END.

. -- THOUGH ANKARA HAD ACQUIESCED IN DIRECT MILITARY-TO-MILITARY TALKS, THE RESULTS HAD TO BE SPELLED OUT IN DETAIL SO THAT ALL THE IMPLICATIONS COULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE DPC.

. -- ANKARA COULD NOT TOLERATE A SPECIAL GREEK RELATIONSHIP TO NATO, AND THE ONLY WAY TO AVOID THIS WAS TO SPELL OUT ALL THE NUANCES AS CLEARLY AS POSSIBLE.

. B. MISSION OFFICER REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT AWARE OF WHEN SACEUR'S TALKS WOULD BE CONCLUDED BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE TALKS WERE PREMISED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE SUBSEQUENT RESULTS WOULD BE REVIEWED BY THE APPROPRIATE NATO POLITICAL BODY. HE SUGGESTED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE PRODUCTIVE TO REDUCE EVERY POINT COVERED BY SACEUR FOR DPC CONSIDERATION IN WRITING. THERE MIGHT BE SOME ASPECTS THAT THE GREEKS WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT BUT PERHAPS LEFT AS AN ORAL UNDERSTANDING. THOUGH THE USG AND GOT WERE TOGETHER ON THE QUESTION OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP, IF THE TALKS/NEGOTIATIONS WERE TO PRODUCE ANY MEANINGFUL RESULTS ALL SIDES WOULD HAVE TO BE FLEXIBLE ON DOTTING I'S AND CROSSING T'S. SOME LINGERING AMBIGUITIES WERE INEVITABLE. OZCERI SAID ANKARA WAS PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE ON SOME ASPECTS, CONFIDENTIAL

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AS LONG AS THE IMPLICATIONS WERE UNDERSTOOD. THERE WERE OTHER ASPECTS, HOWEVER, PARTICULARLY THOSE DEALING WITH THE GREEK-TURKISH MILITARY RELATIONSHIP (E.G., AIR DEFENSE, COMMUNICATIONS AND EXERCISES) WHERE ANKARA COULD NOT BE FLEXIBLE - THE RELATIONSHIP WOULD HAVE TO BE SPELLED OUT IN DETAIL.

. 2. TURKEY ARMS EMBARGO. OZCERI SAID IF THE US TURKISH AID RESTRICTIONS WERE REMOVED, THIS WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE ANKARA'S FLEXIBILITY ON THE GREEK-NATO NEGOTIATION. THIS WAS NOT A VEILED ATTEMPT TO LINK THE TWO EVENTS FOR LEVERAGE, HE SAID, BUT A SIMPLE REFLECTION OF POLITICAL REALITIES.

. A. ANKARA WOULD BE ABLE TO EASE SOMEWHAT ITS HARDLINE ON THE NATO NEGOTIATION BECAUSE OF THE FAVORABLE IMPACT LIFTING THE EMBARGO WOULD HAVE ON TURKISH PUBLIC OPINION, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY BECAUSE IT WOULD CLEARLY DEMONSTRATE TO THE GREEKS THAT THE US WAS HENCEFORTH TAKING A MORE EVEN-HANDED POSITION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. AS A RESULT, THE GREEKS WOULD HAVE TO START NEGOTIATING MORE SERIOUSLY WITH TURKEY ON BILATERAL

ISSUES. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT GREEK PUBLIC OPINION MIGHT BE STIRRED EMOTIONALLY IF THE RESTRICTION IS LIFTED, BUT THIS WOULD BE SHORT-LIVED. THE LONG-TERM RESULT WOULD BE THAT GREECE AND TURKEY COULD APPROACH OUTSTANDING BILATERAL ISSUES ON AN EQUAL FOOTING, THAT EQUALITY DOES NOT EXIST WHEN ONE OF THE PARTIES TO A NEGOTIATION IS "BEING PUNISHED" BY THE LEADER OF THE WESTERN WORLD.

. B. OZCERI SAID THAT ECEVIT HAD BEEN GREATLY

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ENCOURAGED BY THE ADMINISTRATION'S ATTITUDE ON REMOVING THE RESTRICTION. AS ONE WHO HAD WORKED CLOSELY WITH ECEVIT IN THE PAST, HE FELT THE SUMMIT HAD HAD A SALUTARY EFFECT ON ECEVIT'S OUTLOOK.

. C. ANKARA WAS AWARE THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WAS INVESTING SOME OF HIS OWN POLITICAL PRESTIGE IN TRYING TO LIFT THE EMBARGO AND ASSUMED WASHINGTON UNDERSTOOD THAT ECEVIT WAS TOO BY FOLLOWING WASHINGTON'S LEAD. HE HOPED, THEREFORE, THAT ANKARA COULD BE ALERTED IF IT LOOKED AS THOUGH CONGRESS WOULD NOT SUPPORT THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL SO THAT ECEVIT COULD PREPARE HIMSELF POLITICALLY. MISSION OFFICER SAID HE WOULD PASS THAT THOUGHT ON BUT SPECULATED THAT THE ISSUE MIGHT BE

IN DOUBT UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT AND THAT ANY NEGATIVE
ACTION ANKARA MIGHT TAKE PREMATURELY COULD INFLUENCE
THE VOTE AGAINST OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS.

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3. TURNING TO THE LTDP, MISSION OFFICER EXPLAINED CURRENT
US THINKING ON THE NEED FOR PROGRAM MONITORS TO PRESERVE
THE FUNCTIONAL CHARACTER OF THE LTDP AND TO IMPROVE THE
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERLINESS OF THE FOLLOW-THROUGH PROCESS.
OZCERI SAID HE THOUGHT ANKARA WOULD PROBABLY BE WILLING TO
ACCEPT SUCH AN APPROACH, SINCE IT MADE ADMINISTRATIVE SENSE
AND DID NOT CREATE NEW CHANNELS OF AUTHORITY OR NEW POWERS.
HE SPECULATED THAT MOST ALLIES SHOULD BE ABLE TO SUPPORT
SUCH A PROPOSAL, IF IT WERE MADE EARLY AND NOT OFFERED UP
AS A US COUNTER-PROPOSAL AFTER PETRIGNANI'S PAPER HAD BEEN
CIRCULATED. GLITMAN

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